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WEST VIRGINIA MARRIAGE LAW
CuzE L. CoisoN*
I. TE NATURE OF M&RRiGE
In order to avoid possible confusion, it is well to bear in mind
that the term "marriage" is used in two senses. In one sense it
means simply the relation of husband and wife. So defined, mar-
riage is a status, the rights and obligations of which are determined
by law. On the other hand, "marriage" is often used to mean
the act, whether by formal ceremony or otherwise, by which the
status of husband and wife is established. In this sense marriage
may properly be spoken of and dealt with as a contract'
To say, however, that marriage is in one sense a contract is
not to say that even in its contractual aspect it is governed entire-
ly by general contract principles. On the contrary, it should be
noted that the contract of marriage differs from an ordinary con-
tract in several particulars. For instance, the marriage contract
of an infant, if he be above the age of consent, is not voidable.2
Again, in states which do not recognize informal or common-law
marriages, strict requirements as to form must be satisfied before
there is a valid marriage. 3 There is the further difference that in
general it takes more fraud to make a marriage voidable than is
necessary in the casd of other contracts.4 All of this, however, does
not prove that the marriage contract is truly no contract at all, as
some would have us believe,' but proves rather that it is a special-
ized type of contract governed by rules peculiarly its own.
There is a tendency to enlarge the concept of marriage as a
contract so as to include not only the marriage contract itself,
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I But Of. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DomESTIC RELATIONS (1931) § 3, where he
says, "Marriage, in the sense of the act by which parties become husband and
wife, has been called a contract, but strictly speaking it is not so." In the
same section, Note 4, however, he does violence to his own definition by saying
that "The contract of inarriage being a civil contract, the rules to be applied
thereto must be, to a great extent, the same as are applied to other contracts."
(Italics ours.) The whole matter is, of course, simply one of terminology, and
since confusion may be avoided by recognizing the two senses in which the
term "marriage" is used, there would seem to be no sufficient reason for our
refusal to follow the established usage in this connection.
2 Infra at 42.
SInfra at 35.
4 Ifra at 44.
5 MADDEN, op. alt. supra n. 1, at 4. Cf. PECK, DoEsTIC RELATIONS (3d ed.
1930) 129-131.
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where the concept is properly applicable, but also to include the
status or relationship of marriage, where it is wholly inapplicable.
Such danger of confusion, however, as is present in this ten-
dency is obviated merely by keeping in mind the dual nature of
marriage. In other words, one should remember that marriage in
its relational sense is simply the status of husband and wife, and
that this status is established by contract of the parties. Thus at-
tention is called to the contractual as well as to the relational /as-
pect of marriage.
That marriage has this dual aspect is recognized by the West
Virginia court:
"The status of marriage has its inception in contract, and
its validity depends largely upon the validity of the contract
upon which it is based." 6
In considering the problem of annulment, our attention will be di-
rected almost wholly to the question whether the marriage contract
is valid. In view of this fact, far from being objectionable, it would
seem to be of positive advantage to recognize that'in one sense mar-
riage is contractual.
II. REQUISITES FOR A VALID MARRIAGE
A. In General
Briefly stated, in order for there to be a valid marriage in
West Vilginia there must be a formal ceremony in compliance with
the statutory provisions, an expression of mutual consent to the
assumption of the relation, which assent must be given by parties
who are capable of expressing an intelligent consent and who are
also legally capable of entering into the marriage relationship.
These various requirements will be considered separately, though
not necessarily in the order stated, all except the first being dealt
with in connection with the specific grounds for annulment.
B. Formal Requisites
According to the view taken by more than half the states no
formal ceremony is necessary to the creation of a valid marriage.
In such states an informal expression of mutual assent is sufficient,
the statutes setting forth a formal procedure for the celebration of
6 Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va. 664, syl. 2, 104 S. E. 117 (1920). See
also same case, 91 W. Va. 91, 94-95, 112 S. E. 234 (1922); Kester v. Rester,
106 W. Va. 615, 620, 146 S. E. 625 (1929).
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marriage being construed to be directory only. The prevailing
opinion is that these statufes should not be taken as mandatory in
the absence of express language making invalid marriages cele-
brated in any other manner.'
West Virginia, however, refuses to recognize informal or com-
mon-law marriages contracted in this state. In order to have a
valid marriage here there must be a formal religious ceremony. It
should be noted that although under our statute duly qualified
ministers are the only persons who may properly perform the cere-
mony," it is expressly provided that marriages solemnized by an
unauthorized person are nevertheless valid if either or both of the
parties being married should in good faith believe him qualified.'
The decision that informal or common-law marriages in this
state are invalid was reached despite the fact that our statute does
not expressly declare such marriages void. In Beverlin v. Beverlin
the court said:
"We think our statute has wholly superseded the common
law and in effect, if not in express terms, renders invalid all
attempted marriages contracted in this State which have not
been solemnized in substantial compliance with its pro-
visions. ' 0
Although recognizing that such statutes "have generally and prop-
erly been construed as directory and not mandatory","- the court
concluded that the proviso that some marriages where there had
been a failure to comply with the statute were not to be "deemed
or adjudged void", was equivalent to an express provision that
all other marriages not in compliance with the statute were ta be
treated as void.
As an original proposition one might question the necessity of
this conclusion. Except as an exercise in logic, however, it would
be both pointless and unprofitable to do so at the present time. The
law is too well established that there must be a formal religious
ceremony. But it is interesting to speculate whether the court
7 See MADDEN, op. cit. supra u. 1, §§ 20-22 for collection of authorities and
general discussion of informal or common-law marriages.
s . VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 12.
9 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 15.
1o 29 W. Va. 732, 737, 3 S. E. 36 (1887). See also In re Meade's Estate, 82
W. Va. 650, 655, 97 S. E. 127 (1918); Jackson v. Commissioner, 106 W. Va. 374,
145 S. E. 753 (1928) ; Kester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 615, 146 S. E. 625 (1929);
Fout v. Hanlin, 113 W. Va. 752, 169 S. E. 743 (1933).
11 Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29 W. Va. 732, 738, 3 S. E. 36 (1887).
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would follow the same line of reasoning in dealing with other pro-
visions of the statute.
Starting with the proposition that our marriage statute is
mandatory, there is the further question whether it is mandatory
in every detail. The rule in most other states is that although the
statute is construed to be mandatory, it is so only as to the require-
ment of a formal marriage ceremony. 2 Other provisions such as
those which require that a license be obtained or that the consent
of parents be given are held to be only directory unless there
is express language to the contrary. Thus in Maryland, a state
which like West Virginia refuses to recognize common-law mar-
riages, 13 although the statute provides that no persons "shall be
joined in marriage until a license shall have been obtained", it
was held that a marriage performed without a license was never-
theless valid.14 The court of North Carolina has reached a similar
result.' 5
On the other hand, though there is no definite holding on the
point, there is at least a dictum that the West Virginia statute is
mandatory not only in its requirement of a formal ceremony but
also in its requirement of a license. Our statute providedthat
"Every marriage in this state shall be under a license and
solemnized as provided in this article." 8
Construing a similar provision of the Virginia statute, in a case
where there was neither a license nor a formal ceremony, the Vir-
ginia court said that the statute was mandatory in respect to both
these requirements.' 7 In a West Virginia case, where there was
also no evidence of a marriage ceremony, this Virginia case was
cited with approval, the court saying that
"In order to [have] a valid marriage under the laws of
this state there must have been performed what is ordinarily
known as a ceremonial marriage, that is, the law requiring the
issuance of a license and the performance of a ceremony by
one authorized thereto must be complied with."18
12 MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 64.
13 Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1871).
14 Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Atl. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017 (1916).
'r Wooley v. Bruton, 184 N. C. 438, 114 S. E:628 (1922).
16 W. VA. RBv. Coms (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 5.
1 Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 263, 40 S. E. 910 (1902).
-18 In re Meade's Estate, 82 W. Va. 650, 655, 97 S. E. 127 (1918). See also
Rester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 615, 617-618, 146 S. E. 625 (1929) (question as
to legitimacy of children, the court saying that even if the marriage statute
4
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Despite this clear language, one hesitates to say that a license
is absolutely necessary in this state. In neither of these cases was
the question squarely before the court. T6 raise the point it would
be necessary to have a case in which admittedly there had been
compliance with all statutory provisions except the one requiring
a license. Then the only question would be.whether the statute was
mandatory in its requirements that a license be obtained. Should
the problem be thus presented, it is believed that the court itself
would hesitate to declare the marriage void. It should be noted,
however, that if the court followed the line of reasoning used in
the Beverlin case, it would have to hold the marriage invalid.
Assume for a moment that it is necessary to have a license be-
fore there can be a valid marriage in this state. Immediately other
difficult questions arise. Our statute provides that the license shall
be issued in the county where "the female to be married usually
resides". 19 Suppose that a license is obtained, but in the wrong
county. Would a marriage performed under this license be in-
valid? And if not, why not? If it should be held that the legis-
lative requirement of a license is mandatory, would it not be equal-
ly reasonable to hold that the license required is one issued in com-
pliance with the statute? Again, the statute provides that if the
applicant for a license be under the age of twenty-one and has not
been previously married, the consent of parents or guardian must
be obtained.2" Suppose that a license is issued without such con-
sent, would a marriage under that license be void? In a Virginia
case where this question was raised the court held that the mar-
riage was valid.2 ' It should be noted, however, that after the de-
cision in Offield v. Davis,22 the Virginia legislature, anticipating
the problems just raised, expressly enacted that no marriage should
be invalid by reason either of defects in the license or lack of au-
thority on the part of the one issuing the license.2"
It would be more difficult for the West Virginia court to up-
hold a marriage performed under a defective license. Although
our statute makes valid all marriages solemnized by one not au-
thorized to perform the ceremony if the parties married or one of
was not complied with, there was at least a common-law marriage, the issue of
which was made legitimate by statute); Trent v. State Compensation Com-
missioner, 113 W. Va. 262, 167 S. E. 623 (1932).
19'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 6.
20W . VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § S.
21 Stanley v. Rasnick, 137 Va. 415, 426, 119 S. E. 76 (1923).
22100 Va. 250, 263, 40 S. B. 910 (1902).
23 VA. CODE AX. (Michie, 1930) § 5082.
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them believes in good faith that he is authorized, it makes no pro-
vision for irregularities in regard to the license.2 4 If we should
apply the same reasoning used in the Beverlin case, it would be
easy to find by implication a provision that all marriages affected
by some irregularity, which were not expressly made valid, were
to be treated as void.
It is not believed, however, that our court would hold a mar-
riage void merely because of some defect in the license. Such a de-
cision would entail unfortunate results. There are normally two
considerations which should make courts reluctant to declare a
marriage void. One is the danger of bastardizing the issue of the
marriage, and the other is the danger of disturbing titles acquired
on the assumption that the marriage was valid. Although the first
consideration is without weight in this state because the children
of void marriages are expressly made legitimate by statute,25 the
threat to the security of titles is of real consequence. In this con-
nection two things should be borne in mind. First, it should
be noted that a void marriage may be collaterally attacked in any
proceeding, whereas a voidable marriage may be questioned only
in a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose0 during the life-
time of the parties to the marriage.2" In the second place, most of
these collateral attacks are made after the death of the husband to
prevent the widow from sharing in his estate, and there would seem
to be no reason why the attack might not also be made long' after
she has been given her share of the property. If this reasoning is
sound, and if such collateral attacks would be successful merely on
a showing that there was no license or that the license had been
improperly issued, it would necessarily follow that title to much
property in this state would be rendered insecure. There must have
been many cases in which the license was issued in the wrong coun-
ty or in which by reason of a false statement of age by the appli-
cant the license was obtained without the consent of parents or
guardian. Faced with the prospect of invalidating numerous exist-
ing marriages and of thereby disturbing the security of titles, it is
confidently believed that the court would refuse to allow the col-
lateral attack in such a case.
24 W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 15.
25W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 42, art. 1, § 7. See Kester v. Kester, 106 W.
Va. 615, 617-618, 146 S. E. 625 (1929) where this section was applied.
26 Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 2, 153 S. E. 293 (1930).
27 Hastings v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378, 383 (1918). But see infra at 50.
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To reach that result it would have to hold our marriage
statute directory at least in respect to the provisions dealing with
the county in which the license should be issued and with
the'necessity for the consent of parents or guardian. Further, in
view of the fact that it would not be logically consistent to hold
those provisions directory, and yet to hold mandatory the provision
that there must be a license, it is hoped that the court, when
presented with the problem, will follow the prevailing view and
hold that our statute is mandatory only in so far as it requires a
formal religions ceremony.
Such a decision should not be hard to reach in light of these
additional considerations. In the first place, the license require-
ment is largely a regulation in furtherance of the legislative policy
that the so-called vital statistics of birth, marriage and death be
made matters of public record. It would seem that this policy is
sufficiently safeguarded by those provisions of the statute which
punish not only the clerk who improperly issues the license,2" but
also the person who performs the ceremony without a license.29
There appears to be no necessity for penalizing the parties to the
marriage. In fact it may well be argued that by imposing the
penalties mentioned above, the legislature has shown an intention
that no other penalties be imposed. This argument is fortified by
the further consideration that the legislative policy of this state
is clearly against having marriages declared void in collateral pro-
ceedings. 30 This is shown by the fact that many marriages which
would have been void at common law have been expressly made
voidable and thus subject to attack only in annulment proceed-
ings.3 1
The Maryland court in sustaining the general argument just
advanced used language which would seem to apply as well to
West Virginia:
"The regulative purposes of the license statute are use-
ful and important, but they are sought to be enforced by
pecuniary penalties pronounced against those officiating at
unlicensed marriages, and not by the radical process of render-
ing void and immoral a matrimonial union otherwise validly
contracted and solemnized .... The principle that such pro-
28 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 48, art. 1, § 20.
2 . VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 21.
3o See Judge Maxwell's dissent in Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 12-13,
153 S. E. 293 (1930).
31 W. VA. REv. CODs (1931) c. 48, art. 1, §§ 1 and 2. But see infra at 50.
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visions are directory only, has been adopted in jurisdictions
where a religiouA ceremony is not regarded as an essential
element 6f a marriage according to the common law, and it
would seem that in a State like our own, where this additional
sanction and safeguard is required, there is even stronger rea-
son for the rule that the validity of such a marriage should
be sustained." 3 2
Before leaving this problem it should- be pointed out that if a
marriage is questioned, there is a presumption in favor of its valid-
ity 33 If the parties to the marriage have lived together as husband
and wife and have generally been recognized as such, the natural
presumption is that they must have been legally married. As was
said by the West Virginia court, in a case where no marriage had
been directly proved,
" .... circumstances, conduct of the parties, cohabitation
apparently matrimonial, and general marital repute, so estab-
lish a presumption that a legal marriage existed between the
parties, that it must be taken as true since there is not a
word to rebut it."3
In the absence of evidence to the contrary this presumption is
sufficient to uphold the validity of the marriage, but being only a
presumption of fact, it is of course subject to rebuttal, as was in-
timated by the court.2
Although informal marriages in this state are void, it does
not follow that they are wholly without legal effect. They are ac-
corded a limited recognition under our statute declaring legitimate
the issue of void marriages. It is settled that under this statute
the issue of an informal marriage is legitimate.3 7 There remains,
however, the question whether the parties have contracted a good
common-law marriage. In a recent case, which outlines the re-
32 Feebley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 570-571, 99 At. 663 (1916).
s3 W. VA. Rsv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 2. After providing for suits to
affirm or annul marriages there is the further provision that "tn every such
case, and in every other case where the validity of a marriage is called in
question, it shall be presumed that the marriage is valid, unless the contrary
be clearly proven. . . ." It should be noted that this applies both to direct
and collateral attacks on a marriage. For a general discussion of this pro-
sumption see MADDEN, Op. cit. supra n. 1, § 24.
34 Miller v. Miller, 76 W. Va. 352, 353, 85 S. E. 542 (1915). Accord: Suter
v. Suter, 68 W. Va. 690, 693-694, 70 S. E. 705 (1911).
s52.T re Meade's Estate, 82 W. Va. 650, 656, 97 S. E. 127 (1918); Hall V.
Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 9-10, 153 S. E. 293 (1930).
so W. VA. Rzv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 1, § 7.
37 Kester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 615, 146 S. E. 625 (1929).
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quirements for a common-law marriage, the children were held
illegitimate because these requirements had not been satisfied. 8
Except for the purpose of making the children legitimate our
court refuses to recognize a common-law marriage contracted in
this state, but it will recognize a common-law marriage contracted
in another state where such marriages are valid 9 This is but an
illustration of the general conflict of laws principle that a con-
tract valid where made will be recognized as valid in other states
unless to do so would run counter to some strong policy of
the forum. A policy of this sort is involved in the case where a
marriage is contracted in another state by residents of West Vir-
ginia with the express purpose of evading the law of this state. In
such case, not only will our court refuse to recognize the validity
of the marriage, but by statute may entertain a suit for its annul-
ment.40
M. ANNMMENT
In the beginning, it should be noted that although many of
the marriages which may be annulled in this state were at common
law wholly void so that no decree of annulment was necessary, our
statute has made all such prohibited marriages voidable only.
This means that they are to be treated as valid until a decree of
annulment has been entered.41
The circuit court, on the chancery side, has sole jurisdiction
of suits to annul or affirm marriages.42 As a general rule such suit
may be brought only when one of the parties is at the commence-
ment of the suit a bona fide resident of this state. There is, how-
ever, one exception to this rule. Although both parties are non-
residents, if the marriage was contracted here and no matrimonial
3s Fout v. Ranlin, 113 W. Va. 752, 169 S. E. 743 (1933).
39 Jackson v. Compensation Commissioner, 106 W. Va. 374, 145 S. E. 753
(1928). See algo Miller v. Miller, 76 W. Va. 352, 355, 85 S. E. 542 (1915);
Perkey v. Perkey, 87 W. Va. 656, 658, 106 S. B. 40 (1921).
40W . VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 17. Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va.
301, 302, 46 S. B. 120 (1903) (Pennsylvania marriage between nephew and
aunt was annulled upon showing that the parties were married there to evade
the laws of this state). And see Perkey v. Perkey, s ipra n. 39, where although it
was held that this statute did not apply because it was not alleged that the
marriage was contracted in another state to evade the West Virginia laws, there
was a clear intimation that had this been the case the marriage would have been
annulled.
41 . VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1.
42 . VA. Rzv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 6.
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domicile has been established elsewhere, the marriage may be an-
nulled in this state."
A. Specific Grounds for Annulment
(1) Marriage below the age of consent. It has already been
pointed out that a marriage is not valid unless the parties are
legally capable of giving an intelligent consent. At common law
the age at which such consent could be given was fourteen for
boys and twelve for girls. The common-law ages of consent, how-
ever, have been raised by statute in West Virginia to eighteen and
sixteen respectively."
4
A marriage contracted by parties above the age of consent is
binding. Even though one of the parties may not have reached
majority, his marriage contract unlike his other contracts may not
be avoided on the ground of infancy." On the other hand, at com-
mon law the marriage of one who is less than seven years old is
void, while the marriage of one over seven but under the age of
consent is only voidable.
It is not clear what the law of West Virginia would be in re-
spect to the marriage of one less than seven years old. In Perkey
v. Perkey, the court said:
"At common law the age of consent of the female was
twelve years, that of the male fourteen years, but marriages
under those ages and over seven were not regarded void, but
voidable only .... Statutes like ours were not intended to do
more than raise the ages of consent, leaving the rules of com-
mon law in all other respects unimpaired and in full force." 4"
But in view of our statutory provision that "all marriages solem-
nized when either of the parties ... was under the age of consent"
shall be voidable,47 query whether a marriage under the age of
seven is void or only voidable.
However that may be, there is no doubt that in the normal
43 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 7. See Titus v. Titus, 115 W. Va.
229, 174 S. E. 874 (1934) (annulling a marriage contracted in this state by
residents of Pennsylvania). Note that by statutory provision, W. VA. REV.
CODE (1931) e. 48, art. 2, § 9, the venue of annulment and divorce actions is
the same. This being true, the question of venue has been left for detailed con-
sideration in a subsequent article which will deal with the divorce law of West
Virginia.
44 . VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 1.
45 Flint v. Gilpin, 29 W. Va. 740, 742, 3 S. E. 33 (1887) (dictum). And see
MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 13.
4o Perkey v. Perkey, 87 W. Va. 656, 659, 106 S. E. 40 (1921).
47 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1.
10
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ease marriages under the age of consent are voidable only and are
valid until entry of a decree of nullity.48 If but one of the parties
is below the age of consent, he alone may sue to annul the mar-
riage, and even he may lose this right by affirming the marriage
after he reaches the age of consent.
49
(2) Insanity and intoxication. Our statute explicity makes
voidable marriages solemnized when either of the parties was in-
capable of expressing an intelligent consent because of his mental
condition.50 Note that only an incapacity existing at the time when
the marriage was contracted is made ground for annulment, neither
prior nor subsequent incapacity being sufficient. In view of the
clarity of the statute it is not surprising that no case could
be found expressly holding that insanity or similar incapacity was
ground for annulment. But there is one case in which the mar-
riage was attacked in a federal court after the death of the insane
party. Applying our statute which makes such marriages void
only after entry of a decree of nullity, the court refused to allow
the collateral attack and held that the marriage could be questioned
only in a direct proceeding to annul or affirm it during the life-
time of the parties."
The marriage of a mentally incompetent person is voidable
simply because of a lack of consent on his part. For the same rea-
son, when one of the parties is so intoxicated as to be unable to
express an intelligent consent, most courts hold that the marriage
is voidable.2 Although there seem to be no West Virginia cases
on the point, there is reason to suppose that the court would follow
the accepted rule should this question come before it. Our legis-
lature has impliedly recognized that as a general proposition lack
of consent on the part of one of the parties is ground for annul-
ment. Such recognition is implicit in the provision that no suit to
annul a marriage may be brought "where the cause is lack of con-
sent on the part of either of the parties, by the party consenting
or bringing about the marriage."153 It also seems safe to predict
48 Perkey v. Perkey, 87 W. Va. 656, 658, 106 S. E. 40 (1921).
49 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(d). To the effect that either
party could annul such marriage at common law, see MADDEN,, op. cit. Suprr
n. 1, at 31.
60 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1. Such mental deficiency may be
either insanity, feeblemindedness, idiocy or imbecility.
-' Hastings v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378 (1918).
2 MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 27-28 and authorities there cited.
53W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(e). And see infra at 45, where
lack of consent was due to the fact that the marriage was contracted in jest.
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that our court would hold that marriages, which are voidable be-
cause of a lack of consent due to the mental condition of one of
the parties, may be ratified after removal of the disability."
(3) Fraud and duress. Another example of a marriage void-
able because the requisite mutual assent is lacking is one in which
the consent of one of the parties is obtained by fraud. In a case
where the court held sufficient on demurrer a bill alleging that the
plaintiff was induced by fraud to go through with the marriage
ceremony, it was said:
"As the fraudulent representations or conduct of either
party, when proved, vitiate a contract, whatever the subject
of the negotiations may be, so such representations and con-
duct have the same force and effect upon the validity of'a con-
tract of marriage; certainly so if not consummated, and per-
haps also even after its consummation, unless the plaintiff has
in some manner waived the fraud. . .,,
That the rule would be the same when the consent was
obtained by duress is shown by the statutory provision that no
annulment suit may be brought,
"Where the cause is fraud, force or coercion, by the party
who was guilty of such fraud, force or coercion, nor by the
injured party if, after knowledge of the facts, he or she has
by acts or conduct confirmed such marriage. . . . O
According to the generally accepted view the fraud which is
sufficient to vitiate a marriage contract must be of a serious na-
ture. 57 Each case must of course be decided on its own facts, and
interesting differences of opinion exist as to whether particular
fraudulent conduct is sufficient ground for annulment. Courts
have differed on the questions whether concealment of pregnancy
by another, or concealment of prior unchastity or other misconduct
is such fraud as to make the marriage voidable. That there are no
West Virginia cases on these questions is probably due to the fact
that the matters are expressly covered by our statute. It is not
even necessary to place the suit on the ground of fraud since the
statute provides that,
". ... all marriages solemnized when either of the
parties, prior to the marriage, without the knowledge of the
54 See W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3 and Reviser's Note dealing
with the matter of confirmation.
55 Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va. 664, 668-669, 104 S. E. 117 (1920).
GOW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(b).
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1936], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol43/iss1/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
other, had been convicted of an infamous offense, or when, at
the time of marriage, the wife, without the knowledge of the
husband, was with child by some person other than the hus-
band, or prior to such marriage had been, without the knowl-
edge of the husband, notoriously a prostitute, or when, prior
to such marriage, the husband without the knowledge of the
wife, had been notoriously a licentious person; shall be void
from the time they are so declared by a decree of nullity.'""
In all these cases the right to annulment is lost if after learning
the facts the injured party confirms the marriage5 9
Although these statutory provisions cover the matters which
are normally dealt with in other states as fraudulent concealments,
and although the situations outlined would seem to include
numerically the bulk of cases in which fraud has been used as the
basis for annulment, it by no means follows that other fraudulent
concealments and misrepresentations may not be ground for an-
nulment in West Virginia. On the contrary, in the language quoted
above the court clearly intimates that any fraud sufficient to nega-
tive the existence of real consent will vitiate the marriage contract.
(4) Marriage in jest. Still another example of a marriage
which is invalid because of a lack of the requisite mutual assent
is to be found in the case where the parties have gone through with
the marriage ceremony in a spirit of jest and with no real consent
by either party to the establishment of the relation of husband
and wife. In such a case the West Virginia court said:
"... mutual consent and bona fide agreement of the
parties, freely given and with the intention of entering into
a valid status of marriage, are fundamental and essential
elements, and without them the marriage is invalid....
"As neither plaintiff nor defendant ... gave their [sic]
free and willing consent to be bound by the ceremony, or as-
sume towards each other the relation ordinarily implied in its
performance, . . .and have not since done any act . . . indi-
cating a purpose so to be bound, there appears no reason for
refusing to order the annulment of the pretended marriage.$$80
If only one of the parties thinks that the ceremony is
performed in jest and the other has a secret intention to be bound,
r7 MADDEN, op. ct. supra n. 1, at 9-22.
G8 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1.
59 W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(f, g, h).
00 Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va. 664, 667-668, 104 S. E. 117, 11 A. L.
R. 212 (1920); Accord: Id. 91 W. Va. 91, 112 S. B. 234 (1922); Meredith v.
Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S. E. 520 (1924).
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it would probably be necessary to base the action for annulment
on the ground of fraud.8 1 On the other hand, if at the time of the
marriage both parties understand that the whole matter is a joke,
the fact that one of the parties subsequently changes his mind and
decides to be bound by the contract will not deprive the other
party of his right to an annulment.8 2
It should be noted that our statute nowhere specifically makes
voidabl a marriage contracted in jest. The court in these cases
placed its decision on the "inherent jurisdiction and power of a
court of equity with respect to all civil contracts, voidable upon
any ground cognizable by such courts."8 3 The court also intimates
that other grounds not mentioned, such as mistake, might be basis
for annulling a marriage. 4
Although the inference is clear that marriages contracted in
jest are voidable, which would accord with the general legislative
policy of making all invalid marriages voidable only, the court
later expressly declared that such a marriage was void ab initi.0 5
(5) Relationsip. In order to have a valid marriage, not only
must there be an expression of mutual consent by parties capable
of expressing an intelligent consent, but it is also necessary that
the parties be not otherwise legally incapable of contracting mar-
riage. 6 So far we have considered only cases in which the mar-
riage was voidable because one or both of the parties could not give
an intelligent consent or because there was in fact no real consent.
We turn now to cases in which the marriage is voidable because of
some other disability making it illegal for the parties to marry.
The first such disability to be considered is kinship by blood or
marriage within prohibited degrees of relationship.
81 This was the alternative ground in the first case of Crouch v. Wartenberg,
supra n. 60.
62 Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 244-245, 122 S. E. 520 (1924).
83 Id. at 230. If statutory authority is thought necessary, it might be inf er-
red from W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(e).
84 Id. at 245-246.
65 Meredith v. Shakespeare, 97 W. Va. 514, 125 S. E. 374 (1924) (denying
wife right to suit money under W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 48, art. 2, § 13).
Query whether this holding applies to all annulment suits or only to those
where the marriage is void instead of voidable. And see Chapman v. Parsons,
66 W. Va. 307, 311, 66 S. E. 461 (1909). Note that under c. 48, art. 2, § 15,
as amended by Acts 1935, c. 35, § 15, it is clear that no alimony may be awarded
in an annulment suit, but the court may enter a decree as to custody and
maintenance of children and may make such order effective by a decree con-
cerning the estate of the parties. - Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12
S. E. 736 (1890).
Cf Supra at 34.
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Our statute specifically sets out the relatives a person may not
legally marry.0 7 If the prohibited relationship was created by
marriage, the prohibition continues despite the dissolution of the
marriage on which the relationship is based.8 Although a mar-
riage in violation of these provisions is only voidable,69 it cannot
be affirmed. Because of the strong policy against such a union, an
incestuous marriage will be annulled after many years of cohabita-
tion even at the instance of one who knowingly entered into the
marriage.0 As in the case of other prohibited marriages, unless
one of the parties sees fit to have it annulled during the lifetime
of the other, an incestuous marriage will be treated as valid for
all purposes. Both parties to such a marriage may, however, be
subjected to criminal liability.71
(6) Disability due to phtysical condition. Although the parties
are otherwise capable of contracting a valid marriage, they may
be placed under a legal disability by reason of their physical condi-
tion. Thus, the West Virginia statute provides that
". ... all marriages solemnized when either of the parties
was ... an epileptic, or was afflicted with a venereal disease,
or was incapable, because of natural or incurable impotency
of body, of entering into the marriage state, . . . shall be void
from the time they are so declared by a decree of nullity."7-
A marriage voidable because of the impotency of one of the
parties may not be annulled at the instance of a party who had
knowledge of this fact at the time of the marriage. 73 Similarly, if
the marriage is voidable because one of the parties was at the time
of the marriage afflicted with a venereal disease, it may not, be an-
nulled by the party so afflicted if he has subsequehtly been cured,
or by the other party if, after such cure, he has affirmed the mar-
riage.7 4
67 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 48, art. 1, § 2 (relatives a man may not
marry); c. 48, art. 1, § 3 (relatives a woman may not marry).
as W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 48, art. 1, § 4.
19W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1, "all marriages which are pro-
hibited by law on account of consanguinity or affinity .... shall be void from
the time they are so declared by a decree of nullity."
To Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120, L. R. A. 19120, 728n
(1903) (marriage between nephew and aunt annulled after eighteen years
cohabitation).
71 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 18.
72 Acts 1935, c. 35, § 1, amending W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1.
73W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 3(a).
74 Acts 1935, e. 35, § 3(c), amending W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2,
§ 3(e).
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(7) Miscegenation. Marriages between a white person and a
negro are prohibited and the white person who contracts such a
marriage is subject to criminal liability. 5 Here again, however,
the marriage is only voidable, and will be treated as valid until
one of the parties sues for annulment. 70
(8) Prior subsisting marriage. There is one other situation
where a marriage, though contracted by parties who could and did
give the requisite consent, is nevertheless invalid because one of
them was under a disability making it illegal for him to marry. It
is, of course, illegal for a person to contract 'a second marriage if
at the time he is already married, and one who does so is subject
to prosecution for bigamy.77 For present purposes, however, we
are interested only in the question of the validity of the second
marriage.
At common law such a bigamous marriage was wholly void
even though contracted in good faith upon a reasonable belief that
the former marriage had been dissolved by death or divorce. This
was at one time the rule in West Virginia.7 8 Under our present
statute, however, a bigamous marriage is voidable only.75 The fact
that in this state such a marriage is voidable and not void
has raised some interesting problems and has led to results which
are surprising, to say the least.
In Sledd v. Compensation Commissioner" the plaintiff's
claim as widow had been denied by the commissioner on the
ground that at the time of her marriage to the deceased workman
she had a husband living and undivorced, and that consequently
she was not the widow of the deceased. Overruling this contention,
the court held that the second marriage was only voidable, that
since it had not been dissolved by a decree of nullity, it could not
be collaterally attacked by the commissioner in this proceeding,
and consequently that the widow was entitled to compensation.
However, the court did not reach this result without serious
misgivings as to the necessary implications of such a holding. Due
to the requirement that she must not be living separate from the
75 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 1, § 19.
76 W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) e. 48, art. 2, § 1.
77 W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 61, art. 8, §§ 1 and 2.
78 Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736, 12 L. R. A. 50 (1890).
79 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 1.
80 11 W. Va. 509, 163 S. E. 12, 80 A. L. R. 1424 (1932).
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deceased at the time of the injury,"" there is not much danger that
a woman might collect compensation for the death of two hus-
bands. But there is real danger that she might under the rule of
this case claim dower and other rights in the estates of two or even
more husbands. In anticipation of this and similar absurdities to
which the logical application of our statute would lead, the court
prepared itself a loophole when it said:
"Of course an individual may be convicted of the crime
of bigamy though there has been no decree of annulment.
What effect such conviction would have upon the claim of the
guilty party for compensation need not now be considered.' 2
Further, in the syllabus, instead of saying that the widow was en-
titled to compensation unless the bigamous marriage had been an-
nulled, the court said she was so entitled in the absence of a
"judicial determination" that the second marriage was bigamous. 3
Thus there is a possibility that the court would hold that a con-
viction for bigamy is such a judicial determination that the second
marriage was bigamous as to be equivalent to the "decree of
nullity" mentioned in the statute. Now it would seem to be too
clear for argument that the legislature had in mind only a decree
of annulment entered by a court of equity under its jurisdiction
to annul or affirm marriages. But on the other hand, if it should
be held that a conviction for bigamy was enough to make the second
marriage void, the court probably ought not to be too severely
criticized -there are times when a court is justified in resorting
to spurious interpretation in order to give at least partial relief
from the consequences of rl-advised legislative action.
Another loophole was left in connection with the question
of the time when the second marriage may be attacked. So far we
have assumed that all voidable marriages in this state may be ques-
tioned only in a direct proceeding for annulment brought by one
of the parties during the lifetime of the other. This would again
seem to be the clear intent of the statute. Were it not for the com-
plications raised by the fact that in West Virginia bigamous mar-
s8 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 23, art. 4, § 13. Note however that she might
collect for both if she could bring herself within the rule of Coletrane v. Com-
pensation Commissioner, 86 W. Va. 179, 103 S. E. 102 (1920) as to what con-
stitutes not "living separate" under this statute.
82 Sledd v. Compensation Commissioner, 111 W. Va. 509, 511, 163 S. E. 12(1932).
83 Id. at 509.
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riages are voidable, this would apparently be our rule, for in dis-
cussing the problem the court said:
"The general rule is that a voidable marriage is regarded
as practically valid until its nullity is declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction within the lifetime of the parties....
"Where there exists the distinction of the common law
and the canonical law between void and voidable marriages,
the former may be attacked collaterally even after the death
of one or both of the parties, but the latter may be attacked
only within the lifetime of the parties....
"Our statute has done away with this distinction." 84
If the court had said no more, the rule as stated above would be
correct. It probably is correct in respect to all other voidable mar-
riages. But the court, dissatisfied with this rule as applied to
bigamous marriages, went on to say:
". ... Under it (our statute) there is only one rule and
it declares that the forbidden marriages shall be void from
the time of decree of nullity. Code, 48-2-1. The query arises:
When can this be done? Must it be done within the lifetime
of the parties as under the common law rule pertaining to
voidable marriages? If so, a bigamous spouse would share in
the estate of the one to whom he or she had been unlawfully
married. The right of the surviving spouse could not be chal-
lenged. This cannot be the intent of the law, certainly as to
bigamous marriages. It would be unreasonable. A bigamous
marriage should be open to attack, under -our statute, even
after the death of one or both of the parties, just as at coin-
mon law, otherwise an innocent former spouse, or children of
the decedent (not of the bigamous marriage), might be
greatly wrongel . . .'
The court here had in mind a case in which the decedent left
two or more wives surviving him, and they are all claiming a share
in his estate or are claiming compensation for his death. In
Coletrne v. Compensation Commissioner,8" it was held that the
first wife was entitled to compensation. Under the rule of the Stedd
case, the second wife if she was living with the man at the time of
the injury, could also collect. But aside from the compensation
cases where this matter of cohabitation is important, it is clear
84 Id. at 510-511.
85 Id. at 511-512.
86 86 W. Va. 179, 103 S. E. 102 (1920).
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that several widows would be entitled to share in the estate of their
deceased husband.
Such a result is probably so unreasonable as to justify the
court's reading into the statute an exception permitting collateral
attacks on bigamous marriages. But if the collateral attack be
allowed in order to prevent several wives from sharing in the
estate of or collecting compensation for one husband, there is no
logical reason why it should not also be allowed to prevent one
wife from asserting claims in respect to several husbands.
Another entirely illogical result of the statute as it now stands
is this: Although a second wholly bigamous marriage is only void-
able, if the bigamous spouse goes to the trouble of getting a di-
vorce, but marries again within the prohibited period 87 the second
marriage is void ab initio 8 Assuming the correctness of the rule
that a wholly bigamous marriage is voidable, one would think that
as an original propositioiaa bigamous marriage after a divorce but
within the prohibited period would a fortiori be only voidable.
Thus, the dissenting judges in Hall v. Baylous would seem to have
the better of the argument. On the other hand, however illogical
it may seem, one can readily understand the position of the ma-
jority who, being dissatisfied with the rule that bigamous marriages
are voidable and wishing to escape the difficulties outlined above
in at least this limited group of cases, availed themselves of the
opportunity to declare such marriages within the prohibited period
void.
The truth of the matter is that under the statute as it now
stands it is impossible to deal with the matter logically. These
cases cannot be put into the order of reason until the legislature
sees fit to change the statute and go back to our former rule that
all bigamous marriages are void ab initio. Such a change in our
law would immediately put all these cases on the same basis, and
would thus not only clear up the illogical muddle they are now in,
but would also remove the difficulties which have been anticipated
by the court. The legislature should never have enacted a rule so
unworkable as to compel resort by the court to strained and spuri-
87 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 22 as amended by Acts 1935, c.
35, § 22.
88 Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S. E. 293 (1930). Remarriage in
violation of such prohibition raises conflict of laws problems which though
interesting are beyond the scope of this article. In this connection see Mc-
Manus v. Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 566, 169 S. E. 172 (1933); Johnson v.
Commissioner, 116 W. Va. 232, 179 S. E. 814 (1935) ; Note (1927) 33 W. VA.
L. Q. 207.
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ous interpretation in order to avoid the undesirable results which
would follow its logical application. But having done so, the least
that the legislature can do would be to relieve the court of this
necessity by amending our statute so as to make all bigamous mar-
riages void instead of voidable.
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